The colony of Italian East Africa was to be short lived, and on 18
January 1941 Emperor Haile Selassie would cross the border into
Abyssinia and raise his flag and march at the head of his irregular
army into Addis Ababa on 5 May.
The second Italo-Abyssinian war was devastating for Abyssinia.
Over three-quarters of a million people were killed, half a million
houses were destroyed, along with six million cattle, seven million
sheep and goats, a million horses and mules and two thousand
churches.
By June 1940 the balance of power, as we shall see, was entirely
in favour of the Italians. The bulk of British strength was
concentrated to defend the Suez Canal, and so was in Egypt. There
were small forces of both British and French troops in their
respective Somaliland territories.
With France falling in May 1940, the Mediterranean, the Middle
East and East Africa were all vulnerable. It was very much a question
of what Mussolini would choose to do, as it seemed that the
initiative was very much with him. It would have been relatively easy
for the Italians to seize almost anything for very little cost.
There was an enormous danger with Italy joining the war for the
Mediterranean to become untenable for the Allies. If Italy were to
press its claim for control of the Mediterranean, then British forces
bound for the Middle East would have to be brought all around Africa
and come into the Middle East via the Red Sea. This, then, made East
Africa all the more important. A strong and determined Italy, in
control of the entrance to the Red Sea, could place Britain’s
tenuous control of the Suez Canal, Egypt and vital oil assets in
jeopardy.
Some attempts had been made to strengthen the Royal Air Force in
the Sudan, British Somaliland, Kenya and Aden. Any such move,
however, would only seek to weaken the already stretched forces in
Egypt. There could be no hope of launching any offensive action in
this theatre either on the ground or in the air. What assets could be
spared in East Africa were little more than police forces and patrol
units.
Although Italian East Africa was vast, it was not an ideal theatre
of war with its enormous highlands, deserts and rainy seasons. Across
the region there were areas that were virtually deserts, while others
were sub-tropical. There were few good roads, and in the rainy season
they became almost impassable. There were just two railway lines: one
ran from the Eritrean port of Massawa to Asmara and Tessenei, and the
other ran from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland.
Although Italian East Africa was some 600 per cent larger than
Italy itself, it was effectively cut off. To send troops, supplies or
ammunition meant that the vessels would have to pass Gibraltar and
then proceed down the west coast of Africa, around the Horn and up
the east coast towards Italian Somaliland. In any case, both the
Italian army and the air force were designed primarily as a colonial
force. There was only a single, regular, Italian division – the
Savoy Grenadiers. There were also territorial units, or Blackshirt
battalions. These were men predominantly middle aged, with little in
the way of training or equipment, who had somehow been persuaded to
avoid the humiliation of unemployment at home for the uncertain
virtues of life in East Africa.
The bulk of the army was, however, native units. They were
recruited on a tribal basis. They were not designed to fight
conventional wars; they lacked mobility, were terrified of artillery
fire and were led by aloof Italian officers on horseback. There were
also native scouts and skirmishers, again led by Italian officers.
Added to this there were also irregular troops, who tended to be used
for police duties. To support the ground forces there were a handful
of tanks and armoured cars, mostly old and poorly maintained. The
artillery was also outdated, and even anti-aircraft defences were
poor. In all, the ground forces could muster some sixteen battalions,
a pair of armoured car companies, two squadrons of tanks, ten
artillery units, 123 native battalions, eight units of cavalry, some
light artillery carried by mules and some irregulars. In total the
Italians could muster upwards of 280,000 men. This was increased to
330,000 in June 1940. Reservists had been called up, although most of
these men were either too old or too poorly trained to be of any use.
There was a shortage of rifles, and many native units had been
deployed as road builders.
Considering the enormous distances involved and the poor
infrastructure, added to which the troops available were not suitable
for large-scale offensive actions, it was understandable that Italian
commanders in East Africa were unwilling to consider much more than
defence.
Facing the northern borders with the Sudan were some 100,000
troops. These were primarily concentrated from the Red Sea coast to
the border facing Khartoum. Some 83,000 men were on the borders of
French and British Somaliland, 20,000 men formed the Army of the
Juba, 40,000 were in central Abyssinia and just a scattering of
forces covered the rest of the Sudanese border and the border with
Kenya.
Ground forces were supported by a small Italian navy based in the
Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. They had two squadrons of
destroyers and eight largely unserviceable submarines.
The Italian Air Force, or Regia Aeronautica, was of a reasonable
size. The bulk of the aircraft were Caproni Ca 133s. They were
perfectly designed for their original purpose. The aircraft were
monoplanes with three engines, and could be used for bombing, troop
carrying or cargo carrying. But they were only any good if the enemy
did not have their own aircraft or anti-aircraft defences; simply
they were too slow and too poorly armed.
Another common aircraft was the Savoia S.81. This was a
three-engined monoplane with fixed undercarriage. It would turn out
to be so poor that it would only be used at night. Another aircraft
deployed by the Italian Air Force in June 1940 was the Savoia S.79.
It was a three-engined monoplane with a retractable undercarriage.
Two of its five machine-guns were 12.7 mm, and it was without doubt
the best aircraft to be deployed by any force in the region. The
third engine, in the nose, limited its effectiveness, particularly
when it was used on bombing missions. Added to this, there were very
few spare parts for the aircraft.
Two of the fighter squadrons were flying the Fiat CR.32. It was a
biplane, and, as the Italians would discover, it was far too slow to
catch their bombers. Three other fighter squadrons were equipped with
Fiat CR.42s. It was to be one of the more successful Italian aircraft
in the theatre. The Italian pilots would discover that it was more
manoeuvrable than the Hurricane and faster than the Gladiator. The
three squadrons of CR.42s – 412th, 413th and 414th Squadrons –
would have mixed fortunes. The best squadron was the 412th.
Another fighter squadron, the 110th, was flying Meridionali
Ro.37bis, twin-seat biplanes. They were originally designed for
reconnaissance, observation and army co-operation. They were to prove
particularly useless when ordered to intercept enemy aircraft.
The most powerful striking force of the Italian Air Force in East
Africa was, of course, the three main bomber groups. The fighters
were scattered all around East Africa. Generale Pietro Pinna was the
air commander in East Africa. His instructions on the outbreak of war
were to hit any British airfields or ports within striking distance.
The availability of bombs was to be a considerable problem. He would
reserve his 250 kg bombs for stationary ships in port. Ships at sea
would be attacked with 50 kg bombs.
In all, across Italian East Africa, there were nine Italian
aircraft groups. Each of the groups could have from two to eight
squadriglie. Broadly speaking, the strength of one of these was
similar to an RAF flight. However, the Italian fighters were usually
in the larger squadriglie, and these could be as large as an RAF
squadron.
The Italian Air Force was organised into three distinct areas.
Comando Settore Aeronautico Nord (Air Sector Headquarters North) was
based in Asmara in Eritrea. The 26th Group could muster twelve
Caproni Ca 133s (11th and 13th Squadriglie). These were based at
Gondar and Bahar Dar. The 27th Group had the 18th and 52nd
Squadriglie, also with a dozen Ca 133s at Assab. The 118th
Squadriglia, also part of 27th Group, with half a dozen Savoia S.81s,
was also based at Assab. At Zula was 28th Group with the 10th and
19th Squadriglie, and they had twelve S.81s. The 62nd and 63rd
Squadriglie of 29th Group were based at Assab with a dozen S.81s. The
rest of the group was scattered, apart from 413th Squadriglia, with
its nine CR.42s at Assab. The 412th Squadriglia had four CR.42s at
Massawa and five at Gura. Also at Gura was the 29th Group’s final
squadriglia, the 414th, with six more CR.42s. At Agordat there was
Gasbarrini Group, with twelve Caproni Ca 133s (41st Squadriglia and
Squadriglia Dello Stato Maggiore Del Settore Nord).
On the western side of Italian East Africa, based at Addis Ababa,
was the Comando Settore Aeronautico Ovest. The 4th and 44th Gruppi
were based at Diredawa. The 4th Gruppo, consisting of the 14th and
15th Squadriglie, mustered some twelve Savoia S.81s. The 44th Gruppo,
consisting of the 6th and 7th Squadriglie, had twelve Savoia S.79s.
The 49th Gruppo, based at Jimma, was made up of the 61st and 64th
Squadriglie with some twelve Caproni Ca 133s. Both the 110th and
410th Squadriglie were also at Diredawa; the 110th had nine Ro.37bis
and the 410th had nine CR.32s. Based at Addis Ababa was the 411th
Squadriglia, also with nine CR.32s, and Squadriglia Dello Stato
Maggiore Del Settore Centrale with six Ca 133s. The 65th Squadriglia
had six Ca 133s and was based at Neghelli, and the 66th Squadriglia
was at Yavello with three Ca 133s.
Based around Mogadishu was Comando Settore Aeronautico Sud. This
consisted of the 25th Gruppo, which had the 8th and 9th Squadriglie
with twelve Ca 133s. Half of these were based at Gobwen, and the
other half at Lugh Ferrandi. Finally, at Mogadishu were the seven Ca
133s of the Squadriglia Dello Stato Maggiore Del Settore.
The Italians also had a considerable number of transport aircraft.
There were nine Savoia S.73s and a similar number of Ca 133s. There
was one Fokker FVII and six Ca 148s. The reserve forces consisted of
thirty-five Ca 133s, six CR.42s, five CR.32s, four S.79s and two
Ro.37bis. In addition to this were aircraft that were currently under
repair, and these included forty-eight Ca 133s, sixteen S.81s, eleven
CR.32s and two of each of S.79s, CR.42s and Ro.37bis.
Although the numbers of aircraft presented an impressive total,
one of the key problems was the position and the state of the
airfields. The bulk of the airfields were at the edges of the Italian
territories and therefore potentially vulnerable. Many of the
airfields had also been designed primarily for use by Ca 133s, and as
a consequence the runways were too short for S.79s and CR.42s. The
crews were not, by and large, the most adept of pilots; few had
decent navigation skills; maps were at a premium; few of the aircraft
had radios, and this meant that it was difficult not only to
communicate between ground and air but to co-ordinate the flights
themselves.
Allied forces in the region were neither that impressive nor
necessarily well positioned. In the Sudan, based at Erkowit, was the
impressively named Advanced Striking Force of the RAF. It comprised
254 Wing, which had three squadrons, all of which had been supplied
with the Vickers Wellesley. This was a single-engined bomber, and in
every other theatre barring the Sudan it had already been phased out.
No. 47 Squadron, commanded by Wg Cdr J.G. Elton, was actually based
at Erkowit. At Port Sudan was Sqn Ldr A.D. Selway’s 14 Squadron,
and at Summit was 223 Squadron, commanded by Sqn Ldr J.C. Larking.
Attached to 47 Squadron was D Flight of the Sudan Defence Force,
commanded by Gp Capt Macdonald. They had been supplied with seven
Vickers Vincent biplanes. On 3 June 1940 they were reinforced by nine
Gloster Gladiators of 112 Squadron. They would be based at Summit and
would be responsible for protecting Port Sudan and other bases in the
Sudan. By August 1940 Air Cdre L.H. Slatter would be in position to
take command of all forces in the Sudan, as part of 203 Group.
AVM G.R.M. Reid commanded both the ground forces and air assets in
the Aden Protectorate. Reid’s responsibility was not only to deal
with tribesmen in Aden, but also to protect vessels passing through
the Red Sea. Based at Khormaksar was 8 Squadron, commanded by Sqn Ldr
D.S. Radford. No. 8 Squadron had a flight of Vincents and a flight of
Bristol Blenheims. No. 94 Squadron, based at Sheik Othman and
commanded by Sqn Ldr W.T.F. Wightman, had a single flight of
Gladiators. Working alongside 8 Squadron at Khormaksar was 203
Squadron. Wg Cdr J.R.S. Streatfield had Blenheim IVs, which had been
converted to operate as long-range fighters. In June 1940 Blenheim Is
of 39 Squadron were en route from India to Sheik Othman, and more
Blenheim Is were coming from Singapore, as part of 11 Squadron. They
were also due to set up at Sheik Othman.
To the south of Italian East Africa, in Kenya, there were no RAF
units available at the start of 1940. In April, 1 Squadron of the
Southern Rhodesian Air Force arrived at Nairobi and became part of
237 Squadron. They were equipped with Army Co-operation biplanes,
mainly Hawker Harts, Hardies and Audaxes.
Additional air assets would be provided by the South African Air
Force. In September 1939 the South Africans could muster sixty-three
Hawker Hartebeests (these were converted Hawker Harts), eighteen
Junkers Ju86s (these were former South African Airways airliners that
had been converted into bombers and reconnaissance aircraft), six
Hawker Fury Is, four Hawker Hurricane Is and a single Blenheim IF.
Britain had provided South Africa with several additional aircraft
by May 1940, including Avro Ansons (maritime reconnaissance) and some
Vickers Valentia Transports. A further ten Ju52/3M aircraft,
belonging to South African Airways, had been requisitioned as
military transports. The South Africans had also been able to create
three squadrons of Hawker Hurricanes and Furies. The flights,
commanded by Capt S. Van Schalkwyk, Lt B.J.L. Boyle and Lt S. van
Breda Theron, became operational by the middle of 1940. The unit was
commanded by Maj N.G. Neblock-Stuart.
On 13 May 1940 the pilots of the first two flights were
transported to Egypt to be converted to use Gloster Gladiators. They
were trained on Gloster Gauntlets. Once the training period was over,
they would ferry their own aircraft south to Nairobi. Six days later,
on 19 May, Maj R. Preller’s 11 Bomber Squadron, with twenty-four
Hartebeests and a Fairey Battle, headed for Nairobi.
There was more reshuffling; 12 Bomber Squadron had their Ansons
replaced by Ju86s, and along with 1 Squadron’s Hurricanes they too
headed for Nairobi, arriving there on 25 May. The Ju86s were
commanded by Maj C. Martin, and the Hurricanes were led by Lt Theron.
Once 12 Squadron had arrived at Nairobi, together with 11 Squadron,
they became 1 Bomber Brigade under Lt Col S.A. Melville. No. 1
Squadron’s Furies were disassembled on 26 May and ferried to Kenya
on board the SS Takliwa, arriving in Kenya on 1 June. Two of 11
Squadron’s flights shifted to Mombasa.
By the second week of June there were forty-six South African
aircraft, a single Rhodesian squadron and additional aircraft for
liaison duties available in Kenya. No. 12 Squadron’s Ju86s were
dispersed, with A Flight, commanded by Capt Raubenheimer, at
Dar-Es-Salaam, B Flight at Mombasa under Capt D. Meaker, and Capt D.
Du Toit’s C Flight remaining at Nairobi.
Completing the Allied air forces available was a tiny force in
French Somaliland. This was the Armée de l’Air. It had eleven
Potez 25 Army Co-operation biplanes, four Potez 631 reconnaissance
bombers, three Morane 406 fighters and a pair of Potez 29 transport
and liaison biplanes.
